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ABSTRACT 
This paper considers the contentious issue of consultation with the 
tangata whenua under the Resource Management Act 1991. More 
particularly, an analysis is conducted of the duties of the local authority in 
the resource consent procedure. Section 8 of the Act prescribes that all 
persons exercising functions and powers under the RMA, shall take into 
account the principles of the Treaty ofWaitangi. This section has been 
interpreted in one line of cases as imposing an active duty of consultation 
on the local authority, or the officer of that authority. Conversely, the 
Planning Tribunal in another line of decisions has refused to accept that 
consultation is a Treaty principle which has unqualified application in the 
resource consent procedure. The overall position is one of confusion. 
This paper will analyse the two conflicting lines of authority on this 
issue. Further, the reasoning behind an active duty of consultation is 
considered in order to establish that such a duty is not legitimate under 
section 8 of the RMA. The duty is then tested against the principles of 
natural justice, to determine the effects on impartial decision-making in this 
context. Finally, a solution is offered which would arguably resolve the 
conflict on this issue and remove the potential threats to natural justice. 
This piece of work is dedicated to my mother Norah and my brother 
Michael. 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography 
and annexures) comprises approximately 14850 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The Resource Management Act 1991 ("RMA") was enacted to restate 
and reform the law relating to the use of land, air, and water resources. 
That Act defines the "environment" widely to encompass, for example, 
cultural conditions affecting people and communities.1 The Act regulates 
the use of these resources partially on the basis of the potential effects of a 
use on the environment. 
This paper will consider one cultural aspect of the RMA. The Act 
expressly incorporates the principles of the Treaty ofWaitangi, in 
recognition of Maori culture as a constituent part of the wider 
environment. Section 8 of the Act states that all persons exercising 
functions and powers under the RMA, must take into account the 
principles of the Treaty. 
The starting point for this analysis will be a consideration of how the 
Planning Tribunal has interpreted section 8 of the Act. There are two 
broad lines of authority which are in a state of conflict. The basis of this 
conflict is whether section 8 requires the local authority to conduct 
consultation with the tangata whenua in the resource consent procedure, or 
requires something less than that. 
The Planning Tribunal in Gill v Rotorua District Council 2 held that 
section 8 of the RMA imposes an active duty of consultation on the local 
1 See the definition of "environment" in s2 of the RMA. 
2 (1993) 2 NZRMA 604. Note that both the expression "local authority" and the term "council" are 
used in this paper. They are both intended to refer to the local authority as defined in s2 of the RMA. 
The use of both is a reflection of a similar approach in the case law on this issue. The "consent 
authority" is also referred to occasionally, and this expression refers to the local authority in its 
decision-making capacity under the RMA, see the definition in s2. 
5 
authority. This approach has been subsequently endorsed by the tribunal 
and the High Court. There have, however, been a number of other 
decisions in which the tribunal has refused to affirm the principle 
expounded in Gill. Further to this both lines of authority display elements 
of internal inconsistency. The result of this is an overall lack of clarity and 
direction in the decisions on this issue. 
This paper will consider the cases on consultation, in an attempt to 
define the law as it presently stands, and in order to trace the evolution of 
the consultation principle. An analysis of the reasoning used in decisions 
such as Gill will then be conducted in order to test the legitimacy of an 
active duty of consultation under section 8. This duty will also be tested 
against the standards of natural justice, to determine whether impartial 
decision-making under the RMA is jeopardised. Finally, an alternative 
approach to that taken in Gill will be offered, which the writer believes is a 
solution to the confusion apparent in this area of law and the natural justice 
concerns identified in the paper. 
6 
II THE WIDER ISSUE OF CONSULTATION 
It is essential that the scope of this inquiry is carefully defined and 
limited. This will ensure that the analysis is more than a summary of a wide 
range of interrelated issues. The concept of consultation, even if limited to 
the RMA context, is very wide and raises a number of issues worthy of 
careful analysis. The writer therefore has chosen to concentrate on one 
specific aspect within the broader heading of consultation with the tangata 
whenua under the RMA. That aspect is the confusion which has arisen 
with respect to consultation by the local authority in the resource consent 
procedure. This confusion is a result of different approaches to the 
interpretation of section 8 of the Act. 
In the interests of completeness however, it is necessary to at least 
identify some of the issues which are related to the subject matter of this 
paper. These wider issues will not be discussed in any depth in the paper, 
but it is recognised that there are a number of areas of conflict and dispute 
within them which are deserving of further research and discussion. 
This paper therefore does not consider the following issues in relation 
to consultation with the tangata whenua: 
(1) What is consultation? What should it involve? When and how 
should it occur and what is to be regarded as effective consultation? 
(2) Who should be consulted? How can a local authority ensure that the 
appropriate iwi, hapu or wider Maori group are being consulted? 
7 
(3) How legitimate is consultation under the Treaty ofWaitangi? What 
is the Maori view of this process? What alternatives are available? 
(4) What is the nature of the consultation requirements in the other 
parts of the RMA, such as in the preparation of plans and policy 
statements? How does consultation fit in with the principle of sustainable 
management under the RMA? 
There is a range of useful literature available on this wider subject, 
which would provide a good starting point for an investigation of the 
above issues. 3 
3 See for example R Boast and D Edmunds "The Treaty of Waitangi and Maori Resource 
Management Issues" in Brooker's Resource Management (Brooker's, Wellington, 1991); 
Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment Proposed Guidelines for Local Authority 
Consultation with Tangafa Whenua (Wellington, 1992); Ministry for the Environment, Resource 
Management - Consultation with Tangata Whenua (Wellington 1991); DC Kaua Processes of 
Consultation Between Maori and Local Government Agencies Research Paper for the Degree of 
Masters of Public Policy, Victoria University of Wellington, 1995. See also decisions such as that of 
the Court of Appeal in Wellington International Airport Ltdv Air New Zealand [1993] 1 NZLR 671; 
and the Planning Tribunal in Ngati Kahu and Pacific International Investments Limited v Tauranga 
District Council [1994] NZRMA 481. 
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III THE DUTY OF CONSULTATION UNDER THE RMA 
The duty to consult with Maori in the resource consent procedure has 
been considered in a number of cases before the Planning Tribunal. The 
tribunal has, however, been unable to formulate a coherent principle of the 
requirements under the RMA and the law is presently in a state of 
confusion. There has also been one High Court decision on the issue 
which, unfortunately, does not clarify the position of the local authority. 
The confusion is due to differences in the interpretation of section 8 of the 
RMA: 
8. Treaty of W aitangi - In achieving the purpose of this Act, all 
persons exercising functions and powers under it, in relation to 
managing the use, development, and protection of natural and physical 
resources, shall take into account the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi (fe Tiriti o Waitangi). 
The cases on consultation will be analysed in chronological order to 
demonstrate the evolution of the law in this area. 4 
A Gill, Haddon, and Wellington Rugby 
The issue of consultation under the RMA was first dealt with in the 
Planning Tribunal by Judge Kenderdine. Her Honour initially delivered 
three important decisions on consultation which formed the basis for the 
subsequent divisions in the tribunal on this issue. 
4 This is not an exhaustive analysis of the decisions involving consultation under the RMA; see for 
example Panekiri Tribal Trust v Wairoa District Council Unreported, 25 July 1994, Planning 
Tribunal, W 62/94; Campbell v South/and District Council Unreported, Planning Tribunal, 
W 114/94; Sea-Tow v Auckland Regional Council [1994] NZRMA 204; Marlborough District 
Council v New Zealand Rail Ltd [1995] NZRMA 357. 
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5 Above n 2. 
1 Gill 
The first decision to explore the issue of consultation under the RMA 
was that of Judge Kenderdine in Gill v Rotorua District Council. s That 
case involved an appeal against the granting of a resource consent for a 
housing development. The land in question was of special significance to 
the tangata whenua. The tribunal was concerned that the nationally 
important characteristics of the area had not been taken into account in the 
decision to grant the consent. The duty to consult was one of a number of 
issues dealt with by the tribunal. The comments made by Judge Kenderdine 
on this issue were brief but clearly identified the source of the duty to 
consult with tangata whenua in the resource consent procedure:6 
One of the nationally important requirements of the Act under the 
Part II considerations is that account be taken of principles of the 
Treaty of Waitangi 1840: Section 8 of the Act. One of these 
principles is that of consultation with the tangata whenua: see New 
Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1989] 2 NZLR 142 
(CA). 
The tribunal went on to note that the council had not actively consulted 
with the relevant tribe over the proposal, but had merely notified the tribe 
of the situation. These actions were held to be passive and insufficient to 
satisfy the standard required by section 8 of the Act. 7 In the summary of 
findings Judge Kenderdine concluded: "The council did not actively 
consult with the Maori Trustees of Kariri Point Reserve in terms of s 8 of 
6 Above n 2, 616. 
7 Above n 2,616. 
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the Act. "8 The tribunal allowed the appeal on the basis of a number of 
reasons including this lack of consultation. 
2 Haddon 
In Haddon v Auckland Regional Council 9 the tangata whenua applied 
for a review of a recommendation made by the Auckland Regional Council 
(ARC), to the Minister of Conservation ( "The Minister"). That case 
involved an application by the Auckland City Council ("ACC") to extract 
sand off the shores of North Auckland. This activity was classed as a 
restricted coastal activity, and as such the role of the ARC was to make a 
recommendation to the Minister, who in tum acted as the consent 
authority.10 The role of the Planning Tribunal was to perform an inquiry 
into the ARC recommendation, and then report to the Minister. 
Judge Kenderdine noted that the ACC, ARC, Minister, and the tribunal 
itself, were all required to take into account the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. 11 The tribunal stated:12 
[I]t is clear to us the parties had not taken into account the principles 
of being adequately informed, or of consulting sufficiently as to the 
full implications for the hapu of what exactly was proposed . . . early 
enough in the decision-making process. 
This source of this duty of consultation was then considered: "The 
Court of Appeal has established that consultation is a principle of the 
8 Above n 2, 616. 
9 [1994] NZRMA 49. 
10 See ss 117, 118 119 of the RMA. 
11 As parties exercising functions and/or powers under the Act, see above n 9, 60. 
12 Above n 9, 61. 
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Treaty. (See New Zea/and.Maori Council v Attorney General [1989] 2 
NZLR 142.)" 13 
Judge Kenderdine criticised the parties for not consulting the tangata 
whenua parties early enough in the process: 14 
[The counsel for the Minister] drew our attention to the Treaty 
principle of the Crown making informed decisions ... all the parties 
under RMA . . . must be informed where the interests of a Treaty 
partner is concerned and demonstrate ... that they have taken those 
interests into account. To be properly informed therefore the 
parties must consult at the initial stages in the process. 
The tribunal concluded on this issue in the summary of findings by 
stating: "The Treaty principle of consultation in respect of the development 
and protection of the resource appears not to have complied with early 
enough in the application process, given the [tangata whenua's] known 
interest in the area." 1 s 
3 Wellington Rugby 
In Wellington Rugby Football Union Incorporated v Wellington City 
Council 16 Judge Kenderdine considered an appeal in respect of a decision 
by the Wellington City Council to allow facilities to be upgraded at 
13 Above n 9, 61. 
14 Above n 9, 61. 
15 Above n 9, 64. 
16 Unreported, 30 September 1993, Planning Tribunal, W 84/93. 
12 
Athletic Park. The tribunal held in respect of the interests of the tangata 
whenua:17 
It is only if the council officers carry out research or consultation and 
are seen to do so by virtue of the material that they put before the 
council, that it can avoid being in breach of the Treaty provision of the 
[RMA]. 
There are two particular points of interest in this statement by Judge 
Kenderdine. First, the obligation under section 8 is held to be that of the 
council officers, rather the council in some broader capacity. This 
distinction was not made in Gill or Haddon. A number of subsequent 
tribunal cases were distracted by the possibility that Judge Kenderdine 
intended the duty to be that of the consent authority in its decision-making 
capacity. The Wellington Rugby decision suggests that this was not the 
intention in Gill or Haddon. 
Secondly, the above statement in Wellington Rugby indicates that the 
section 8 duty can be discharged by the officer conducting research or 
consultation. This implies a discretion as to consultation which is not 
apparent in the earlier decisions of Judge Kenderdine. 
Her Honour went on to note that the consent authority is also bound by 
section 8, and that it must take into account any relevant principles of the 
Treaty in making its decision.18 
17 Above n 16, 22. 
18 Above n 16, 22-23 . 
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Thus Judge Kenderdine in these three decisions had expounded a 
relatively clear statement of principle on behalf of the tribunal. The duty of 
consultation in the resource consent procedure is that of the council. This 
flowed from section 8 of the Act and the fact that the Court of Appeal had 
identified consultation as a principle of the Treaty in the New Zealand 
Maori Council case. 
B The High Court in Quarantine Waste 
The next decision on this issue was that of the High Court in 
Quarantine Waste (NZ) Ltd v Waste Resources Ltd 19 In that case 
Quarantine Waste was seeking judicial review of a decision by the 
Manukau City Council to proceed on a non-notified basis in respect of a 
land use consent application. The applicants for resource consent, Waste 
Resources, were trade competitors of Quarantine Waste. 
The issue of consultation was dealt with by the court despite the fact 
that the tangata whenua were not party to the proceedings. In support of 
its application for judicial review, Quarantine Waste asserted that the 
council had not discharged its obligation under the RMA to consult with 
the tangata whenua. It was noted that the council had instead relied on the 
ongoing consultation conducted by the applicant. 20 
19 [1994) NZRMA 529. 
20 Above n 19, 542. 
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After discussing the consultation by the applicant, Blanchard J stated:21 
In other circumstances I would have very real qualms about a 
second-hand consultation, with a local authority leaving it to an 
applicant to consult with local Maori interests. The potential for 
distortion by an applicant of their views is obvious. It should be 
emphasised that the statutory and Treaty obligation of consultation 
is that of the consent authority - as the local governmental agency -
not that of the applicant. As the Planning Tribunal has noted in 
Gill v Rotorua District Council ... s 8 requires that persons 
exercising functions under the Act must take into account the 
principles of the Treaty (including that of consultation) and s 7 
requires that particular regard be paid to the 'Maori Issues' listed in 
that section. As the Tribunal has said, s 7 imposes a duty to be on 
inquiry. 
The court stated however that even upon the assumption that 
consultation was necessary, the lack of it in this case did not result in the 
council failing to consider or take into account a relevant factor. For this 
reason relief was not granted. 
This decision therefore endorsed the approach taken by the tribunal in 
earlier cases such as Gill and Haddon. 22 Blanchard Jin the High Court 
expressly adopted the reasoning of Judge Kenderdine in Gill in terms of a 
Treaty based duty of consultation on the local authority.23 Quarantine 
21 Above n 19, 542. 
22 While the court relied upon the decision in Gill, the decisions in Wellington Rugby and Haddon 
were also cited; see above n 19, 537. The Gill approach is affirmed at least in terms of the scope of the 
duty under section 8. However, see the discussion at below n 23 . 
23 Although the result in Quarantine Waste indicates that the duty of consultation is not actually 
mandatory, rather it exists only as a means to ensure that decision-making in conducted in an 
15 
Waste remains the leading decision on the question of consultation and in 
theory should have settled the principle at the Planning Tribunal level. 24 
It is submitted that the approach in the High Court may have been 
different if Blanchard J had been able to consider the jurisprudence that has 
developed on consultation since the early cases such as Gill and Haddon. 
His Honour relied upon the approach taken in these cases, which may have 
been seen as a coherent statement of principle from the Planning Tribunal. 
As the subsequent decisions have revealed, that is not the case. 
C Ngatiwai, Hanton and Rural Management 
It is submitted that the timing of the subsequent tribunal decisions in 
relation to that of the High Court in Quarantine Waste was pivotal in the 
development of the consultation issue. The decisions in Ngatiwai Trust 
Board v Whangarei District Council 25 and Hanton v Auckland City 
Council 26 were both delivered prior to that in Quarantine Waste .27 
The tribunal in these two decisions was therefore free to depart from the 
approach taken in Gill and Quarantine Waste . The tribunal was able to 
express divergent views on the issue without being bound by the High 
Court decision. This allowed for the development of a different school of 
thought in the tribunal on the issue of consultation. 
informed environment. Thus the result in that case is not entirely compatible with the unqualified 
duty of consultation identified in Gill. 
24 A number of the subsequent decisions of the tribunal, however, appear to effectively ignore the 
High Court decision. See the discussion at below n 102. 
25 [1994) NZRMA 269. 
26 [1994) NZRMA 289. 
27 All three cases were heard within the same fortnight, between 7 December 1993 and 20 December 
1993. The decision in Ngatiwai was delivered on 11 February 1994, in Hanton on 1 March 1994, and 
in Quarantine Waste on 2 March 1994. 
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1 Ngatiwai Trust Board 
In Ngatiwai Trust Board v Whangarei District Council 28 the tribunal 
was faced with an argument that the local authority had failed to discharge 
a duty of consultation with the tangata whenua. That case involved an 
appeal against a decision to grant a consent for the subdivision of land to 
establish a camping ground, and for the taking and discharge of water. The 
tangata whenua argued that they had not been consulted by the local 
authority, and relied on Gill and Haddon as authority for this obligation. In 
response to this argument Judge Bollard stated that the decisions in Gill 
and Haddon were not of general application, but were focused on the 
failure of the local authority to "follow up the special background of Maori 
significance present in each instance - both cases being intimately related to 
apparently long-standing cultural issues of which the councils concerned 
could not have been unaware. "29 
The tribunal concluded:30 
28 Above n 25. 
29 Above n 25, 274. 
30 Above n 25, 275. 
As bodies required to act judicially in hearing and determining the 
applications in the light of the evidence forthcoming from the 
applicants and others electing to participate, we do not see that [the 
local authority] having regard to its relevant functions and powers, 
was under a duty to consult with the [tangata whenua] before 
proceeding to hear [the application] ... 
17 
The tribunal did emphasise that a council should be careful in 
scrutinising the supporting information provided by an applicant. Further a 
council officer may be under a duty in some circumstances to consult with 
the tangata whenua prior to a hearing, to ensure that the council is 
adequately informed of Maori concems.31 
2 Hanton 
In Hanton v Auckland City Council 32 Principal Planning Judge 
Sheppard indicated in very strong terms that there is no duty on the local 
authority to consult with the tangata whenua in the resource consent 
procedure. That case involved an appeal against a decision by Auckland 
City Council to grant a land use consent for the construction of a service 
station. The tribunal analysed the issue of consultation in detail. 33 The 
decision included passages from Gill, Haddon, and Ngatiwai. Judge 
Sheppard discussed the duty created by section 8 of the RMA, and 
considered the extent to which consultation was a principle of the Treaty. 
The tribunal focused on the importance of section 8 due to its place in Part 
II of the Act, but went on to note: " ... we would not be entitled to give it 
effect beyond the scope of the words used. "34 
Jl Above n 25, 274-275. 
32 Above n 26. 
33 The decisions in Ngatiwai and Hanton are in fact the first to carefully analyse the basis for 
imposing such a duty on the local authority. In Hanton Judge Sheppard considered the principles of 
the Treaty of Waitangi and the incorporation of those principles into the RMA. Compare decisions 
such as Gill and Quarantine Waste which proceed on the assumption that consultation is a Treaty 
principle which has an unqualified application in the RMA context. 
34 Above n 26, 301. 
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The tribunal emphasised the wording of the section by stating:35 
Although section 8 requires consent authorities to take into account 
the principles of the Treaty, we do not find in its language any 
imposition on consent authorities of the obligations of the Crown 
under the Treaty or its principles. 
The decision in Haddon was then distinguished on the basis that in any 
case where the consent authority is a Minister of the Crown, any decision 
made should be subject to the Crown's obligations under the Treaty. The 
tribunal went on to state that the RMA context is distinct from that dealt 
with in the Court of Appeal decisions where consultation was held to be a 
principle of the Treaty. 36 
Judge Sheppard considered whether the New Zealand Maori Council 
case37 referred to in Gill, could be taken as authority for a duty of 
consultation in the RMA context. His Honour relied on three grounds to 
distinguish the resource consent procedure from the context of the State 
Owned Enterprises Act ("SOE Act"). First, under the RMA the council is 
not disposing of Crown assets in a manner which would render them 
unavailable for the compensation of Treaty grievances. Rather, the council 
is making decisions in terms of appropriate use consistent with the 
principle of sustainable management. Secondly, the RMA involves a 
detailed procedure which does not overlook the position of the tangata 
whenua, but which omits any express duty of consultation. Thirdly, the 
35 Above n 26, 301. 
36 These decisions were made in the context of the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986; see for 
example New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General [1987) 1 NZLR 641 ; New Zealand Maori 
Council v Attorney General [1989) 2 NZLR 142. 
37 [1989) 2 NZLR 142. 
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requirement that a consent authority act judicially is not consistent with a 
duty on that authority to consult with one sector of the community.38 
In conclusion the tribunal noted:39 
We would adopt, with respect, the discussion in the Ngatiwai 
decision of the (Gil/ and Haddon] decisions, and would follow the 
conclusion that a consent authority is not obliged to consult with 
the tangata whenua on a resource consent application. We hold 
that no such duty is to be inferred from section 8 or the Maori 
Council case; ... 
It is worth noting that unlike Gill and Haddon, the circumstances in 
Hanton did not involve matters of special significance to the tangata 
whenua. It was held that there was no evidence that the site in question 
was of any special value to Maori. 40 The tribunal then took a similar 
approach to that in the Ngatiwai decision by conceding that in 
circumstances where the resources in question are the subject of a special 
relationship with Maori: 11 •• • an adviser preparing a report on the application 
for a consent authority should investigate and report on the extent to 
which the proposal would affect that relationship. "41 This action was not 
required on the facts in Hanton due to the lack of any such special 
relationship. 
Thus the tribunal in Ngatiwai and Hanton refused to accept that section 
8 of the RMA imported into the resource consent procedure an unqualified 
38 Above n 26, 301. 
39 Above n 26, 301-302. 
40 Above n 26, 306. 
41 Above n 26, 302. In Ngatiwai this was framed as a duty which may fall on the council officers in 
certain circumstances, above n 25, 274. 
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duty of consultation. This is clearly inconsistent with decisions such as Gill 
and Quarantine Waste. 
3 Rural Management 
The decision in Rural Management Ltd v Banks Peninsular District 
Council 42 is crucial in an analysis of the evolution of the duty to consult 
on the local authority. The reason for this is that the tribunal was presented 
with a choice between the High Court authority in Quarantine Waste, and 
the dissenting views of the tribunal in Ngatiwai and Hanton. The High 
Court decision was not even cited by the tribunal which preferred to follow 
the Ngatiwai and Hanton approach. 43 
This case concerned an appeal relating to the disposal of sewerage from 
a subdivision. The tribunal was again faced with a submission that there 
had been inadequate consultation with the tangata whenua. It was noted 
that the applicant had made "considerable efforts"44 to consult, but that the 
representative of the tangata whenua was uncooperative. The tribunal held 
that consultation is a two-way process, and if one party chooses to 
withdraw from discussions without giving reasons for doing so, that party 
" ... cannot, in our opinion, be later heard to complain that the principles of 
the Treaty have been infringed. "45 
42 [1994) NZRMA 412. 
43 This was despite the fact that the Quarantine Waste decision was delivered three months before the 
decision in Rural Management. 
44 Above n 42, 422. 
45 Above n 42,423. 
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Judge Treadwell went on to consider the decisions in Gill and Haddon, 
and stated:46 
If a reading of those cases leads to the conclusion that a consent 
authority must consult unilaterally with a party to proceedings, 
then quite simply we do not agree. Nevertheless, we do not 
consider that those cases are intended to lead to that conclusion, 
but rather must be read in the context of their own facts . 
His Honour noted the decisions in Ngatiwai and Hanton and observed 
that those cases established that a consent authority must act judicially in 
hearing applications and is not under a duty to consult with any party prior 
to the proceedings. The tribunal held that such a duty would breach a 
fundamental principle in the justice system that one party should not be 
heard without the other being present. 47 It was concluded that the officers 
of the consent authority may consult for the purposes of obtaining 
information which may be considered by the hearings committee along 
with the other evidence presented. 48 
D Whakarewarewa 
In Whakarewarewa Village Charitable Trost v Rotoroa District 
Council 49 Judge Kenderdine was afforded an opportunity to revisit the 
46 Above n 42,423 . 
47 Above n 42 424. 
48 Above n 42, 424. 
49 Unreported, 25 July 1994, Planning Tribunal, W 61/94. 
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issue of consultation, following the division which had appeared in the 
Planning Tribunal. This case involved an appeal against a decision by the 
Rotorua District Council to decline an application to allow living, 
manufacturing, processing, and retailing of Maori arts and crafts in the 
Whakarewarewa village. There was a submission before the tribunal that 
there had not been adequate consultation with the tangata whenua. Judge 
Kenderdine referred to the dicta in Quarantine Waste, and noted that it 
was relevant to the case before the tribunal in two respects. First, the 
council officers had held a pre-hearing meeting with the tangata whenua to 
ensure that adequate information was available. This was held to discharge 
the council's obligation under the principles of consultation implicit in the 
Treaty. 50 Secondly, the tribunal held that the duty of consultation was not 
that of the applicant, for the reasons identified in Quarantine Waste .51 
Judge Kenderdine then impliedly acknowledged the differing opinions on 
the issue of consultation by stating:52 
[C]onfusion seems to have arisen in distinguishing the role of 
'consent authorities', 'local authorities' and 'councils' in this 
question of consultation. It has inadvertently arisen out of the Gil/ 
decision where the word 'council' appears ... 
Her Honour went on to comment: 53 
50 Above n 49, 23. 
51 Above n 49, 23. 
52 Above n 49, 23 . 
It is not anticipated that consultation should be undertaken by the 
council in its quasi-judicial capacity or on a footing that might 
compromise it in that capacity . ... To avoid confusion in the future 
53 Above n 49, 23-24. 
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we propose to use the term 'consent authority' in respect of the 
council sitting in its quasi-judicial capacity, and 'council officers' 
in respect of questions of consultation. 
Judge Kenderdine concluded that this approach was commensurate 
with that of the High Court in Quarantine Waste. 54 
It has been noted that the tribunal was divided on this issue, and it is 
respectfully submitted that Judge Kenderdine in this case attempted to 
reconcile the conflicting approaches which had arisen. The resistance to the 
imposition of this duty on the local authority in Hanton and Rural 
Management was based partially on the principles of natural justice. The 
tribunal in those cases was unable to accept that a consent authority as the 
decision-maker, should consult with one party unilaterally prior to making 
a decision. 
The focus of the Whakarewarewa decision was therefore to reconcile 
the conflict between the section 8 duty of consultation on the council, and 
the role of the consent authority as an impartial decision-maker. Judge 
Kenderdine stated that consultation was the responsibility of the officers of 
the council rather than the consent authority. This approach does deal with 
the natural justice problem inherent in any consultation by the consent 
authority. 55 It is submitted, however, that this does not address the 
fundamental conflict relating to the scope of the section 8 duty. 56 
54 Above n 49, 24. 
55 The argument will be made subsequently in this paper that an issue of natural justice is still 
apparent in the situation where a council officer consults on behalf of the consent authority. See below 
n 144. 
56 See the discussion at below n 99. 
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E The Reaction in the Tribunal 
The tribunal at this point in time was faced with a choice of precedent 
on the issue of consultation. Judge Kenderdine had revisited the issue in 
Whakarewarewa, and had qualified the Gill principle in order to avoid the 
natural justice problems identified in cases such as Hanton. The High 
Court decision in Quarantine Waste, while ignored in Ngatiwai, Hanton 
and Rural Management, was still in theory the leading case on 
consultation. Those later tribunal decisions expounded a fresh principle 
which redefined the duty under section 8 of the RMA and denied the 
existence of an unqualified duty to consult. The reaction to this quandary is 
interesting not only from the evolutionary perspective of the consultation 
issue, but also in terms of the present status of the law on consultation. 
1 Greensi/1 
In Greensi/1 v Waikato Regional Council 57 the tribunal gave a 
summary of the law of consultation with tangata whenua. 58 The focus was 
predominantly on the issue of consultation by the applicant, however Judge 
Treadwell noted:59 
It appears generally accepted law that in these circumstances the 
consent authority itself shall not consult unilaterally with any party 
but that its officers, in the course of investigating the matter, may 
57 Unreported, 6 March 1995, Planning Tribunal, W 17/95. 
58 Judge Treadwell considered the place of consultation in the preparation of plans and policy 
statements, in the decision as to whether an application should be notified or non-notified (fhe High 
Court decision in Worldwide Leisure v Taupo District Council was cited in this respect) and in the 
resource consent procedure. 
59 Above n 57, 7 (emphasis added). 
25 
consult and such consultation would of course include tangata 
whenua. 
The judge then made the most significant inroad into the Gill principle 
to date by stating:60 
As we read cases to date concerning these matters there has been 
an assumption that consultation should take place but ... although 
desirable, there is no compulsion on the applicant for a resource 
consent or on the officers of the consent authority to embark 
unilaterally upon consultation. 
The tribunal therefore denied that section 8 imposed any duty of 
consultation on the officers of the consent authority. It is arguable that this 
statement does not accord with any of the previous tribunal decisions, all 
of which identified at least some form of consultative duty on the council 
officers in special circumstances. His Honour did not provide any 
reasoning to support this proposition, but rather cited it as representative 
of the "cases to date" .61 
2 Paul, Tawa, Aqua King, Banks and Paihia 
The tribunal has subsequently delivered five decisions on this issue 
which reveal not only the current views on consultation, but also 
demonstrate how that forum has reacted to the conflicting opinions in 
earlier decisions. The decision in Greensill arguably heightened the tension 
60 Above n 57, 8 (emphasis added). 
61 Above n 57, 8. Judge Treadwell also presided in Rural Management, his reading of the "cases to 
date" is clearly a view of only one side of the debate in the tribunal. 
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between the approach of Judge Kenderdine and the remainder of the 
tribunal. Further, it is submitted that there were apparent inconsistencies 
not only between the two "sides" of the tribunal, but also between 
decisions such as Ngatiwai, Hanton, Rural Management, and Greensi/1. 62 
Paul v Whakatane District Council 63 involved an appeal against a 
decision by the Whakatane District Council to grant a land use consent for 
a bowling club. The appellant claimed that although consultation had taken 
place with a Trust Board, that his particular rights as the tangata whenua 
of the area had been ignored. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the 
council should have consulted with the appellant as the tangata whenua. 
Judge Sheppard noted the ruling in Hanton, that the consent authority 
is obliged to take into account the principles of the Treaty, but is not 
obliged to consult with tangata whenua. 64 The tribunal seemed to accept 
the interpretation from Hanton, but did not directly deal with the argument 
that the council should have consulted with the tangata whenua. Judge 
Sheppard concluded that the council was entitled to rely on the responses 
from the local Trust Board as indicative of Maori views on the proposal, 
and that this action constituted recognition of the tangata whenua and the 
principles of the Treaty. While the decision is not focused on the 
consultation duties of the council, the lack of such consultation did not 
deter the judge in finding that the requirements of Part II of the RMA had 
been fulfilled. 65 
62 The scope of the duty on the council officers is an example of the internal inconsistencies within 
the "Ngatiwai" line of cases. See the discussion at below n 100. 
63 Unreported, 13 March 1995, Planning Tribunal, A 12/95. 
64 Above n 63, 6. 
65 Above n 63, 8. 
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In Tawa and Ngatai v Bay of Plenty Regional Council 66 the tribunal 
noted that the hearings committee of the consent authority was "required 
to act in a judicial way, and be even-handed between the applicant and the 
submitters opposing the application. 1167 The tribunal further held: "It would 
not have been right for the Regional Council or the members of its hearings 
committee to have themselves consulted unilaterally with any of the 
parties. 1168 Judge Sheppard went on to note that the reporting officer of the 
council behaved appropriately in consulting with iwi representatives to 
ensure that the hearings committee was adequately informed. 
The tribunal endorsed the decision in Greensill, and the use of the term 
11 appropriate1169 indicates that the council officer may have a discretion as 
to consultation, rather than an active duty to consult. The focus in this 
decision seems to be the need for the hearings committee to be adequately 
informed of Maori interests. The tribunal noted: "This having been done, 
we do not consider that the primary hearing was deficient by lacking 
information about those issues. "70 
It is submitted that the decision in Tawa lacks clarity on the issue of 
whether the council officer has a duty of consultation. While the focus of 
the decision is arguably away from a positive duty, Judge Sheppard 
concluded by stating: 11 Nor do we accept that the applicant or the 
Regional council/ailed to consult with [the tangata whenua]. 1171 It is clear, 
however, that the Greensill decision was accepted by the same judge who 
had previously delivered decisions in Ngatiwai and Paul. 
66 Unreported, 24 March 1995, Planning Tribunal, A 18/95. 
67 Above n 66, 7. 
68 Above n 66, 7. 
69 Above n 66, 7. 
70 Above n 66, 8. 
71 Above n 66, 8 (emphasis added). 
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In Aqua King Ltd and Fleetwing Farms Ltd v Marlborough District 
Council 12 Judge Kenderdine considered the council's procedure in 
handling two competing applications for a resource consent over the same 
coastal marine area. In that case the tribunal afforded recognition to 
consultation by the applicant which was not apparent in earlier decisions 
such as Gil/ and Quarantine Waste. The tribunal noted that the applicant's 
consultation operates in conjunction with that required by the council 
officers under section 8 of the Act:73 
We accept that there are two stages of consultation under the Act 
that are required where there are issues of moment to Maori. They 
are the applicant's consultation or otherwise under the Fowth 
Schedule, and the council officers' consultation under Part II of the 
Act which arises from the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi 
1840. That consultation is an obligation which pertains only to 
councils. 
The tribunal noted that the duty on the council officer to consult arises 
independently of anything the applicant may do.74 This decision reaffirms 
Judge Kenderdine's resolve on this issue, and indicates that the tribunal is 
in an unequivocal and ongoing state of conflict. 
In Banks and Gregory v Waikato Regional Council 15 Judge Sheppard 
held that the applicants for resource consent had consulted adequately with 
the tangata whenua. In terms of the obligation on the council the tribunal 
72 [1995] NZRMA 314. 
73 Above n 72, 320. 
74 Above n 72, 320. 
75 Unreported, 22 March 1995, Planning Tribunal, A 31/95. 
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referred to the decision in Tawa and to the principle that a council should 
not unilaterally consult with one party, although a council officer may 
consult where appropriate. The tribunal continued:76 
In this case, it is clear that the official preparing the staff report for 
the [council's] hearings committee on this application made 
sufficient enquiries to enable him to report to the hearings 
committee on the relevant aspects of the proposal, and on how 
those aspects should be addressed ... 
In the most recent case on consultation, Paihia and District Citizens 
Association Incorporated v North/and Regional Council 77 the tribunal 
considered an appeal against a decision to grant a coastal permit. Judge 
Sheppard noted:78 
76 Above n 75, 9. 
[T]he Act does not make any specific requirement of consultation 
by applicants for resource consent, or by local authorities when 
acting in their functions as consent authorities ... It is recognised 
good practice that applicants for resource consents engage in 
consultation with the tangata whenua where their proposals may 
affect the matters referred to in section 6(e) or section 7(a), and 
that those reporting to consent authorities on such applications 
inform themselves and advise on those matters. 
In that case the applicant had consulted, and the council had 
77 Unreported, 10 August 1995, Planning Tribunal, A 77/95. 
78 Above n 77, 20. The judge cited as authority a number of decisions which included, interestingly, 
those of Judge Kenderdine in Whakarewarewa and Aqua King. 
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notified the tangata whenua of the application. The tribunal noted: "This is 
not a case where the applicants or the regional council's reporting officer 
had been careless of the tangata whenua or unwilling to consult those 
known to them to have that status. "79 
The tribunal in Banks and Paihia appears to focus on the need for the 
council officer to be adequately informed of the interests of the tangata 
whenua, and that this information is conveyed to the hearings committee. 
This may be achieved through means such as applicant consultation, 
notification, or "enquiries"80 on the part of the council officer. The active 
duty of consultation identified originally in Gill, has not survived the 
process of evolution which has resulted in the reasoning in later decisions 
such as Banks and Paihia. 
F The High Court in Worldwide Leisure 
There is one other High Court decision which should be mentioned in 
this analysis. In Worldwide Leisure Ltd v Symphony Group Ltd 81 the High 
Court heard an application for judicial review of a decision by the Taupo 
District Council, to proceed on a non-notified basis in respect of an 
application for resource consent. 82 The tangata whenua were party to the 
application for review, and claimed that as a party likely to be adversely 
affected by the application their written approval should have been 
79 Above n 77, 23. This reliance on notification rather than consultation was precisely what Judge 
Kenderdine referred to as "passive" in Gill, and in that case it was held to be a breach of the active 
duty to consult under s8, above n 2, 616, 620. 
80 See Banks at above n 75, 9. These enquiries may arguably include consultation, but may also be 
satisfied by, for example, investigating the results of applicant consultation. 
81 [1995] NZAR 177 (HC). 
82 A council may decide not to notify an application for resource consent if it is satisfied that the effect 
of the activity will be minor, and every person who is likely to be adversely affected has given written 
approval of the application, see s94. 
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required. Cartwright J held that as the tangata whenua had not been 
consulted, the council had failed to take relevant considerations into 
account, and the decision not to notify the application was therefore 
"unreasonable unlawful and invalid. "83 The court stated: "Moreover, s 8 
has been held to place an obligation to consult ... " and referred to Gill, 
Haddon and New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General 84 
as authority. 
It is submitted that this case does not add significantly to this analysis of 
consultation. While it is a High Court decision, there was no more than a 
passing reference to the approach in Gill and Haddon. Further, no 
consideration was given to the wider debate on this issue in the Planning 
Tribunal. 85 Therefore while this case does confirm that consultation may be 
necessary in the decision as to whether an application should be notified, it 
does not arguably affect the status of the debate on this issue. It is 
submitted that while it could be cited as an affirmation of the Gill 
approach, its value in that regard is limited. 
83 Above n 81, 179. 
84 [1989] 2 NZLR 142. Above n 81, 187. Interestingly the court referred to Quarantine Waste in 
relation to another issue, but not in considering the consultation aspect of the case, see above n 81, 
185. 
85 In tenns of the chronological analysis, the decision was delivered after Ngatiwai, Hanton, Rural 
Management, and Whakarewarewa, but before Greensill. 
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IV THE PRESENT STATEOFTHELAWON 
CONSULTATION 
The foregoing analysis served to highlight two aspects of the issue of 
consultation under the RMA. First, it emphasised the state of confusion 
and conflict apparent in this area oflaw. Secondly, it traced the evolution 
of the consultation principle, so that any given case can be considered in 
the context of a progression of tribunal decisions. This section of the paper 
will summarise the various aspects of the consultation issue, in an attempt 
to distil the law as it presently stands. 
A A State of Confusion 
The law relating to consultation with tangata whenua under the RMA is 
in a confused state. There has been one line of Planning Tribunal decisions 
asserting that a positive duty to consult is a necessary implication of 
section 8 and the principles of the Treaty as interpreted by the Court of 
Appeal. 86 Conversely, a number of other decisions have denied that such a 
positive duty exists as a result of section 8. 87 There is also a High Court 
decision which has not been given recognition in the majority of 
subsequent tribunal decisions. 88 
86 For the sake of brevity these will be referred to as "the Gill" line of cases, which includes Gill, 
Wellington Rugby, Haddon, Quarantine Waste , Whakarewarewa, and A qua King. 
87 These will be referred to as "the Ngatiwai" line of cases, which includes cases such as Ngatiwai , 
Hanton, Rural Management, Greensi/1, Paul, Tawa, Banks and Paihia. 
88 Quarantine Waste, above n 19. Interestingly one Planning Tribunal Judge has stated in relation to 
section 8 that a number of recent cases have contributed to "a clearer understanding of the section's 
import and effect." In doing so His Honour referred to inter alia Gil/, Haddon , Quarantine Waste , 
Ngatiwai, Hanton. See Judge RJ Bollard "Some Thoughts on the Planning Tribunal's role in Resource 
Management" [1995) NZL.!38, 39. 
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It could be argued that the overall approach of the tribunal is not 
actually confused or in conflict, and that the two broad lines of authority 
are substantially compatible. This argument would be based on the 
proposition that most of the decisions identify a broad duty on the council 
officer to consult with the tangata whenua, at least in situations where 
there are Maori interests which are likely to be affected. 89 
It is submitted that this proposition fails for two essential reasons. First, 
the fundamental conflict between the approach of Judge Kenderdine and 
that of the other tribunal judges, arises in respect of the obligation under 
section 8 of the RMA. Judge Kenderdine asserts that the section imposes a 
positive and active duty to consult, while the other judges take a more 
expansive view of the obligations imposed. Therefore, while the above 
proposition may suggest a tolerable compromise, it does not account for a 
fundamental difference in opinion as to the obligation imposed by section 8 
of the Act. 
Secondly, the recent decisions such as Tawa, Banks, and Paihia 
demonstrate that the tribunal is not critical of a lack of consultation even in 
circumstances where Maori interests are evident. These decisions involved 
a wider approach to section 8 which focuses on the adequacy of 
information rather than a duty to consult. This simply cannot be reconciled 
with the approach taken by Judge Kenderdine. 
It is submitted that this judicial divergence could be attributed to a lack 
of clarity within the Act itself The Act expressly states that consultation is 
necessary in certain circumstances such as the preparation of plans and 
89 There was no distinction made between the consent authority and the council officer in Gil/, 
Haddon, or Quarantine Waste. However, Judge Kenderdine did make this distinction in Wellington 
Rugby, and arguably the distinction was similarly intended in those other cases. 
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policy statements, but is silent on the requirements in the resource consent 
procedure. 90 This disparity did not discourage Judge Kenderdine from 
identifying a duty to consult on the council on the basis of section 8, and 
this approach has drawn support from commentators in the field. 91 It could 
be argued however that the RMA is clear in its directive that no 
consultation is necessary in the consent procedure. The Gill approach 
could be argued to be in conflict with a clear legislative intention that 
consultation not be required on the part of the council. The argument will 
be made subsequently in this paper that it may be inappropriate to imply 
this requirement into the procedure by virtue of section 8 of the Act. 
Bennion noted in response to the Hanton decision:92 
Several decisions have now been made by the Planning Tribunal 
concerning consultation with Maori under the Resource Management 
Act 1991. They suggest the Act is not as clear on this subject as it 
might be. 
It is submitted that the RMA is ambiguous on this issue. The differences 
in judicial opinion are clear evidence of this. Judge Treadwell touched on 
this when describing Part II of the RMA as "[A] welter oflegislative 
directives, many of which are simply imprecise verbiage. "93 The 
Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment stated in relation to 
consultation on resource consents: "[The council should] ask tangata 
90 See the discussion at below n 108. 
91 R Boast and D Edmunds "The Treaty of Waitangi and Maori Resource Management Issues" in 
Brooker's Resource Management ( Brooker's, Wellington, 1991), TW-52. 
92 T Bennion "Consultation and Resource Management" (March 1994) The Maori Law Review, 1. 
93 Judge W JM Treadwell, address to the New Zealand Planning Institute Annual Conference, May 
1994, reported in Planning Quarterly, June 1994. See the discussion by A Dormer The Resource 
Management Act 1991 - The Transition and Business (New Zealand Business Roundtable, August 
1994). 
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whenua whether the [applicant] has adequately consulted with them and 
whether their concerns have been accommodated in the consent 
application. "94 In comparison the Ministry for the Environment observed in 
relation to local authority consultation requirements in the resource 
consent process: "When hearings are due it does not hurt to invite all 
parties together on [the] marae to discuss the issues. "95 These statements 
clearly do not accord with the Gill approach to consultation. Further they 
were included in guides for local authorities specifically on this issue. They 
indicate that the lack of clarity in the Act has been problematic for more 
than just the Planning Tribunal Judges. 
Parliament may have considered that the resource consent procedure 
does not generally involve "truly major issues"96 and hence a duty of 
consultation would not be justified. The omission of an express duty to 
consult may reflect this intention. Alternatively, in line with the Gill 
approach it may have been intended that an implied duty of consultation 
would have been obvious from the wording of section 8. 
B The Consent Authority shall not Consult 
The tribunal is united in the opinion that the consent authority in its 
quasi-judicial capacity is not to conduct consultation with any party prior 
to the proceedings. The adverse reaction to Gill and Haddon was a result 
of this potential breach of the principles of natural justice. Judge 
94 Parliamentary Conunissioner for the Environment Proposed Guidelines for Local Authority 
Consultation with Tangata Whenua (Wellington, 1992) 28. 
95 Ministry for the Environment Resource Management - Consultation with Tangata Whenua 
(Wellington, 1991) 10. 
96 The Court of Appeal in New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General (1989) 2 NZLR 142, held 
that consultation may be required on "truly major issues". For a discussion of this element see below 
at 119. 
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Kenderdine confirmed in Whakarewarewa that the duty was directed at the 
council officers rather than the consent authority as the decision-maker. 
The Ngatiwai line of decisions97 have emphatically denied that a duty of 
consultation is placed on the consent authority in its decision-making 
capacity. It is submitted that this emphasis has obscured the central issue of 
whether the council officers have an active duty to consult under section 8 
of the Act. The decisions have concentrated on the first of these issues, and 
the second has been dealt with generally as an afterthought. It is submitted 
that the Gill cases did not seriously contend that the consent authority 
should consult in its quasi-judicial capacity.98 The contention was that the 
council should consult in its administrative role on the basis of section 8. It 
is the question of whether a council officer must consult which, 
unfortunately, has been the subject of only a secondary focus in the 
tribunal. 
C The Duty Under Section 8 ? 
A fundamental conflict does exist within the tribunal on the question of 
the source of the duty to consult. The decisions by Judge Kenderdine 
identify a positive duty of consultation flowing from section 8, and the 
principles of the Treaty as identified in the New Zealand Maori Council 
case. Conversely the tribunal in the Ngatiwai line of cases refuses to accept 
that an unqualified duty exists on these grounds. In Ngatiwai for example, 
the focus is on the wider duty to take account of Treaty principles, rather 
than the narrower duty of consultation. In Hanton the tribunal delivered an 
97 See above n 87 for the cases in this line of authority. 
98 See the comments in relation to Wellington Rugby at above n 89. 
37 
express and detailed account of why the Crown's duty of consultation did 
not apply to the council under the RMA. These cases clearly held that 
section 8 did not impose a duty of consultation on the council. 
This recent tribunal decisions tend to adopt the Ngatiwai approach to 
section 8. The focus in decisions such as Tawa and Banks is the wider 
principle of informed decision-making rather than the narrower one of 
consultation. The recent decision by Judge Kenderdine in Aqua King, 
however, affirms that this fundamental conflict is yet to be resolved in the 
tribunal. 
Another issue for consideration is the relationship between section 7 
and section 8 of the RMA in terms of a duty to consult. Interestingly, in 
Gill Judge Kenderdine seems to blend the requirements under section 7 of 
the Act with those under section 8:99 
[Notification of the application] is not what [section 8] requires. 
The council's actions appear to have been merely passive. The test 
which the council has to meet under all provisions of s 7 is a high 
one. It is required to have particular regard to the issues listed. . .. 
The section imposes a duty to be on inquiry. 
It is submitted that there is some danger in fusing the two sections in 
this manner. Judge Kenderdine appears to have justified the imposition of 
the duty under section 8, by reference to the high standard required under 
section 7. While section 7 does prescribe that particular regard be given to 
certain matters including matters of significance to Maori, it does not 
define the manner in which the relevant information should be obtained. 
99 Above n 2,616. This was endorsed by Blanchard Jin Quarantine Waste, see above n 21. 
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Consultation would clearly be one of a number of means to achieve this 
end, however it is submitted that this does not justify a positive duty of 
consultation on the words of section 8. 
A failure to comply with the requirements under section 7 may provide 
grounds for a decision to be challenged, on the basis that the decision-
maker did not pay particular regard to the matters listed in that section. 
Criticism may be directed at the hearings committee for failing to pay 
particular regard to those matters, or at the council officers for failing to 
ensure that sufficient information was available to the committee and the 
parties involved. This criticism may include, at times, a reference to a 
failure to investigate and/or consult sufficiently to obtain the level of 
information required. It is submitted however that the duty under section 8 
is a distinct matter, which operates independently of the duty under section 
7. The fact that consultation may be required at times to satisfy the 
standard under section 7, does not justify section 8 being interpreted to 
impose an unqualified duty of consultation. The duty under section 8 is 
that the principles of the Treaty be taken into account in any exercise of a 
function or power under the Act. While section 7 may impose a duty to be 
on inquiry, it does not specify what form that inquiry should take, nor does 
it create a necessary implication that a positive duty be read into section 8. 
D The Duty on the Council Officers ? 
While the tribunal is in conflict over this issue generally, the majority of 
decisions have identified that some form of consultation either should or 
may be undertaken by the officers of the council. The Gill cases state that 
this is obligatory as a result of section 8, and that the council officers must 
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consult to discharge their duty under that section.100 The other cases in the 
tribunal attribute this responsibility to the council officer in a variety of 
ways. In Ngatiwai the tribunal noted that a council officer may be under a 
duty in certain circumstances to consult with the tangata whenua when that 
officer is preparing a pre-hearing report. The purpose of this consultation 
is to ensure that the report is accurate and comprehensive as to Maori 
interests. In Hanton it was held that where it is known that Maori interests 
are involved, then an adviser preparing a report should investigate and 
report on how those interests are likely to be affected. 101 In Rural 
Management Judge Treadwell noted that if any consultation is to take 
place, then it should be conducted by the council officers and the 
information collated could be placed in front of the committee along with 
the other evidence presented. 
This requirement on the council officers to consult seemed to move 
from an obligation in certain circumstances towards a discretion as the 
tribunal decisions progressed. In Greensill Judge Treadwell took the 
further step of asserting that while it may be desirable, there is no 
compulsion on the council officers to embark unilaterally upon 
consultation. In Tawa and Banks Judge Sheppard noted that a council 
officer is able to satisfy the obligations under section 8, by conducting 
investigations prior to the hearing for the purposes of preparing a report 
for the hearings committee. These investigations may include consultation 
with tangata whenua, however this consultation was not framed as a duty 
but as a means of ensuring that hearings committee is adequately informed. 
In Paihia the tribunal accepted that notifying the tangata whenua of the 
100 Although the distinction between the council officer and the consent authority was not actually 
noted in Gill, Haddon , or Quarantine Waste. See the discussion at above n 89. 
101 The term "investigate" was used by the judge rather than the term "consult". 
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application, and ensuring that the applicant's consultation was sufficient, 
discharged the council's responsibility under section 8. 
The duty on a council officer as defined by the Planning Tribunal is 
therefore relatively unclear. One line of decisions suggest that there exists 
an unqualified duty to consult in all circumstances where Maori interests 
are evident. Other decisions indicate that consultation may be required in 
the preparation of a pre-hearing report to ensure the adequacy of 
information before the hearings committee. In Greensill the tribunal held 
that the officer was not under a duty to consult in any circumstances. In 
Paihia the tribunal did not criticise the officer for relying on notification 
rather than consultation. 
E The Quarantine Waste Decision 
The position of the High Court decision in Quarantine Waste is left in 
doubt following the later tribunal cases. This decision, although in theory 
the leading case on consultation, was not referred to in Rural 
Management, Greensill, Paul, Tawa, Banks, or Paihia. Further to this, the 
dicta in that case has been effectively ignored in all cases apart from the 
decision of Judge Kenderdine in Aqua King. 
Following Hanton, Palmer commented: "The [Quarantine Waste] 
decision was delivered one day after Hanton, and the dicta should be 
applied by consent authorities and the Planning Tribunal whenever 
appropriate. 11102 This clearly has not been the case. 
102 K Palmer" Consultation with the Tangata Whenua under the Resource Management Act" (1994) 
1 BRMB 21. 
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It is difficult to define exactly what can be taken from Quarantine 
Waste. The obiter statement by Blanchard J indicates that the consent 
authority rather than the applicant is vested with the duty to consult. The 
meaning of the words: "as the local government agency11103 is not so clear. 
Presumably this is a reference to the consent authority as the local agent of 
central government. It is not clear how the distinctions made in subsequent 
cases between the consent authority in its quasi-judicial role, and the 
officers of the council upon whom the duty is asserted to fall, relate to this 
statement by Blanchard J.104 
The actual decision in Quarantine Waste is interesting in that it 
potentially undermines the positive duty to consult. The court found that in 
the circumstances, the failure to consult did not bring about a failure on the 
part of the council: " ... to consider or take into account a material and 
relevant factor." 1°5 The focus of the court therefore, was the absence of 
evidence that the council was inadequately informed as to matters affecting 
the tangata whenua. The judgment states that there is a positive duty of 
consultation, yet a failure to discharge this obligation will be irrelevant if all 
material matters are taken into account. It is submitted therefore, that 
while Quarantine Waste affirms the Gill principle, the High Court decision 
is in fact closer to the Ngatiwai focus on the adequacy of information. This 
analysis is important in that it relates to the argument, made subsequently 
in this paper, that a council is able to discharge its obligations under 
section 8 without actually undertaking consultation. 
103 Above n 19, 542. 
104 His Honour referred to both the local authority and the consent authority as being responsible for 
consultation, see above n 21. The Wellington Rugby decision was cited in Quarantine Waste however, 
therefore Blanchard J was aware of the council officer/consent authority distinction. Unfortunately, 
the terms used in the decision are not consistent. 
105 Above n 19, 542. 
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F The Timing of Consultation 
For consultation to be effective it is generally understood to be 
necessary at the initial stages in the process. 106 In Haddon Judge 
Kenderdine held that consultation should have taken place during the 
formulation of the application and prior to notification. In 
Whakarewarewa, however, the same judge accepted that the consultation 
duty had been discharged by the council officer organising a pre-hearing 
meeting. 107 The decisions such as Ngatiwai, Hanton, Rural Management, 
Tawa and Paul all envisage that any consultation conducted would occur 
only at the pre-hearing stage. This is another aspect of this issue which the 
Planning Tribunal has not been able to resolve in a consistent manner. 
G The Effect of Notification and Applicant Consultation 
In the earlier cases such as Gill and Quarantine Waste, the tribunal and 
High Court held that the council is not entitled to rely on the fact that the 
tangata whenua have been notified of the application, or that the applicant 
has conducted consultation. In the subsequent tribunal decisions these 
other factors have been held to discharge the section 8 requirements. As 
noted in Paihia the notifying of the application to the tangata whenua was 
106 See the Court of Appeal in Wellington International Airport Limited v Air New Zealand (1993] 1 
NZLR 671,675, citing with approval the statement by McGechan Jin the High Court decision in the 
same case. See also the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment Proposed Guidelines for 
Local Authority Consultation with Tangata Whenua (Wellington, 1992) 26 where it is emphasised 
that consultation should be conducted early in the process. The Waitangi Tribunal has also referred to 
"the courtesy of early consultation", see Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 
Environmental Management and the Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi -Report on Crown 
Response to the Recommendations of the Waitangi Tribunal 1983-1988 (Wellington 1988) 109. 
101 The pre-hearing meeting would normally occur well after the application had been formulated and 
notified. 
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held to be sufficient. In Rural Management the tribunal focused on the fact 
that the applicant had made genuine efforts at consultation which were not 
reciprocated. These efforts by the applicant were held to discharge the 
consultative requirements under the Act. The tribunal in Tawa and Banks 
similarly viewed the consultation by the applicant and the council as 
complementary and the duty was discharged by the actions of the two 
parties working together. In Aqua King Judge Kenderdine recognised that 
the two forms of consultation worked together, although Her Honour was 
clear that the council's obligation arose independently of anything the 
applicant may do. It seems that there has been a steady retreat in the 
tribunal from the position taken in Gill, that notification and applicant 
consultation will not discharge the section 8 duty. 
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V THE BASIS OF THE DUTY TO CONSULT 
The Planning Tribunal and High Court have clearly struggled to 
formulate a coherent principle in relation to the implied duty of 
consultation under section 8 of the RMA. A fundamental conflict arises 
when one considers whether a positive duty to consult exists, or whether 
consultation is a discretionary means of achieving the wider end of 
informed decision-making. 
It is necessary to examine the basis upon which the Planning Tribunal 
and High Court have, in some cases, imposed a consultative duty on the 
local authority. The duty is not explicit in the RMA, and has been implied 
into the resource consent procedure by virtue of section 8 of the RMA. It 
is submitted that there are a number of compelling arguments against the 
reasoning used in cases such as Gill and Quarantine Waste . Further, it is 
submitted with respect that the focus of the Planning Tribunal and High 
Court should have been on the wider principle of informed decision-
making rather than the narrower one of consultation. 
A The Absence of an Express Duty in the RMA 
There is no express duty of consultation on the local authority in the 
resource consent procedure under the RMA.108 That duty is identified by 
implication in the Gil/ line of cases. However, the RMA is not silent on the 
issue of consultation. The local authority is directed to consult with iwi 
during the preparation of a proposed policy statement or plan, under clause 
3(l)(d) of the First Schedule of the Act. Further, under section 64(1) and 
108 Part VI of the Act pertains to the resource consent procedure. 
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clause 2(2) of the First Schedule, the preparation of a regional coastal plan 
must be conducted by the regional council in consultation with the iwi 
authorities of the region. 
This raises the issue of whether it is appropriate to imply a consultative 
duty into the resource consent part of the Act in the absence of an express 
provision to that effect. This is especially questionable when there is an 
express duty of consultation in another part of the Act. There are two 
conflicting arguments which can be forwarded in this respect. 
On the one hand it could be argued that as Parliament has not expressly 
required consultation by the local authority in the resource consent 
procedure, then no such duty should arise. As stated the basis for this 
argument would be that Parliament has exhaustively defined in the RMA 
those procedures which are to be subject to such a duty. Further, as noted 
in Hanton, the resource consent part of the Act involves a detailed 
procedure which does not overlook the position of the tangata whenua, but 
which omits any express duty of consultation. 109 
Allied to this argument is the issue of consultation by the applicant. It 
could be argued that the consultation requirements on the council in the 
preparation of policy statements and plans, are "mirrored" in the resource 
consent procedure in the Fourth Schedule of the Act. That schedule 
outlines the requirements on an applicant in the preparation of an 
assessment of the effects on the environment. That assessment must be 
included in an application for resource consent. 110 
109 Above n 26, 301. 
110 S 88 of the Act. 
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Clause 1 of the Fourth Schedule specifies the matters which should be 
included in the assessment, and these include: 
(h) An identification of those persons interested in or affected by 
the proposal, the consultation undertaken, and any response to the 
views of those consulted: 
It is clear that Parliament intended the council to consult with the 
tangata whenua in the preparation of plans and policy statements, and this 
intention is expressed in the First Schedule to the Act. It is arguable that a 
similar intention is expressed in the Fourth Schedule, and that Parliament 
intended that the applicant be responsible for consultation in the resource 
consent procedure. However, it has been noted by the tribunal that this 
consultation by the applicant is not mandatory.111 
Conversely, it could be argued that the duties under Part II are 
overriding and apply irrespective of the content of individual parts of the 
Act. The tribunal in the Gill cases relied on the primacy of Part II and the 
fact that the resource consent procedure is subject to it. The duty of 
consultation was implied into the procedure and the lack of express 
provision was not in fact dealt with by the tribunal. This approach has 
some validity in that duties are implied into all parts of the Act through the 
operation of Part II. On this basis the express duty in relation to the 
preparation of plans and policy statements, could be argued to exist in 
addition to the broader duty under section 8. 
111 The use of the term "should" in cl 1 of the Fourth Schedule indicates that applicant consultation is 
not mandatory. See Greensi/1 at above n 57, 8. Note however that the council could delay the 
processing of the application until satisfactory consultation has been conducted, see Aqua King at 
above n 72, 318-319, and the discussion at below n 155. 
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It is submitted that the better view is that Parliament has defined in the 
Act, the instances in which a specific and express duty of consultation is 
placed on the local authority. There is no such intention expressed in Part 
VI and therefore no broad duty of consultation should exist in the resource 
consent procedure. This argument does not deny that a duty exists on the 
local authority to take into account the principles of the Treaty under Part 
II, and that at times consultation may be required to discharge that duty. It 
does, however, deny an unqualified duty of consultation in the absence of 
express provision to that effect. 
B Consultation - A Principle of the Treaty? 
The overriding purpose of this paper is to test the validity of decisions 
such as Gill and Quarantine Waste. It is therefore essential to critique the 
underlying reasoning in those cases. That reasoning may be summarised in 
three broad steps. First, under section 8 the principles of the Treaty must 
be taken into account by those exercising functions and powers under the 
Act, such as the local authority. Secondly, consultation is a principle of the 
Treaty. Thirdly therefore, the local authority is obliged by section 8 to 
consult with tangata whenua in the resource consent procedure. The 
cornerstone of this approach therefore is the assertion that consultation is a 
principle of the Treaty. 
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1 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General 
Judge Kenderdine in Gill relied on the Court of Appeal decision in New 
Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General 112 as authority for the 
proposition that consultation is a principle of the Treaty. It is submitted 
that there is some danger in relying on the New Zealand Maori Council 
case, ("the 1989 case") as authority for a unqualified duty to consult in the 
RMA context. That decision of the Court of Appeal should be viewed in 
the context of the earlier decision of the court in New Zealand Maori 
Council v Attorney General 113 ("the 1987 case"). In that earlier case the 
court rejected the submission that there was a general Treaty principle of 
consultation: "A duty 'to consult' was also propounded. In any detailed or 
unqualified sense this is elusive and unworkable.11114 In the same case 
Richardson J noted: "an absolute open-ended and formless duty to consult 
is incapable of practical fulfilment, and cannot be regarded as implicit in the 
Treaty. 11115 
The Court of Appeal subsequently in the 1989 case stated:116 
In the judgments in 1987 this Court stressed the concept of 
partnership. We think it is right to say that the good faith [owed] to 
each other by the parties to the Treaty must extend to consultation 
on truly major issues. 
An unqualified statement that consultation is a principle of the Treaty 
on the basis of the statements made in the 1989 decision is flawed. The 
112 Above n 37. 
113 [1987] 1 NZLR 641. 
114 Above n 113, 665 per Cooke P. 
11 5 Above n 113, 683 . 
116 Above n 37, 152 (emphasis added). 
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nature of the statements in the 1989 case should be viewed in the context 
of those made in the 1987 case. The later are a qualification of the earlier. 
The court in the 1989 case was clearly not reversing the position taken in 
the 1987 case. Rather it was clarifying the position, and suggesting that 
while consultation had been rejected as an unqualified principle of the 
Treaty, it nevertheless is necessary on truly major issues. It is submitted 
that the later statements were cautionary in nature, and do not constitute a 
sound basis for the proposition that consultation is a principle of the 
Treaty. 
Judge Kenderdine clearly adopted the 1989 case as authority for such a 
duty in the Gil/ line of cases. Her Honour has commented elsewhere on the 
attitude of the Court of Appeal on this issue: "However there was a shift 
away from [the 1987 stance] in a case which followed : [the 1989 case]. "117 
It is respectfully submitted that the 1989 case saw the court clarifying 
rather than shifting stance on the consultation issue. Boast and Edmunds 
have commented that the 1989 statement was delivered: "perhaps in order 
to correct possible misunderstanding." 118 
2 "Truly major issues" 
The 198 9 decision identified that a duty of consultation may arise "on 
truly major issues." 119 This is arguably a clear signpost from the court that 
consultation is not to be considered an unqualified Treaty principle. Rather, 
the court provided a threshold to be satisfied before consultation is 
117 Judge Kenderdine "The Treaty Jurisprudence" in Applications under the Resource Management 
Act 1991, (New Zealand Law Society Seminar Paper, October - November 1993) 17. 
11 8 Above n 91, TW-45. 
119 Above n 37, 152. 
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necessary. It could be argued that consultation was intended by the court 
to be a means to an end rather than a principle itself. That end may be the 
upholding of the concept of partnership, and more particularly, the 
principle of informed decision-making. 
The "truly major issues" qualification has not been given effect by Judge 
Kenderdine in the RMA context. The Gil/ line of cases have relied on 
consultation as a Treaty principle, citing the 1989 case as authority for this 
proposition. Those cases have however failed to consider what is clearly a 
vital qualification to the statements made by the Court of Appeal. 
The 1987 and 1989 cases were concerned with the State Owned 
Enterprises Act ("the SOE Act") and the disposition of Crown assets 
which were potentially the subject of Maori claims. It is not entirely clear 
what would constitute a truly major issue in the RMA context. It has been 
suggested that the phrase may extend to: "[N]ational policy statements and 
the Minister's exercise of the call-in powers, but not necessarily to all or 
even most resource consent applications." 120 
It is submitted that this qualifying phrase further undermines the validity 
of relying on the 1989 case as the basis for a broad duty to consult. It is 
doubtful that a consent application on the scale of those in the Gil/ line of 
cases would constitute a truly major issue in the view of the Court of 
Appeal. This issue evidences the wider problem of extrapolating principles 
from one statutory context into another. In Haddon, the argument was 
forwarded that the SOE Act created a significantly different context to that 
of the RMA, and that there were dangers in extrapolating interpretations 
120 Ministry for the Environment Case Law on Consultation - Working Paper 3 (Wellington, 1995) 5. 
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from the former into the latter. 121 Further, it was argued that the principles 
which apply under the RMA may be different to those in the SOE context, 
"although those identified by the Court of Appeal may prove a useful guide 
in a case like this. "122 Judge Kenderdine accepted these submissions as 
correct, but effectively ignored them by stating: "The Court of Appeal has 
established that consultation is a principle of the Treaty."123 
There are some important contextual distinctions between the SOE Act 
and the RMA. The former allows for assets to be removed from the 
Crown's estate and hence those assets are no longer able to provide a basis 
for the redress of claims under the Treaty. In comparison the RMA 
prescribes the law relating to the use ofland, air, and water. It could be 
argued that "truly major issues" are more likely to arise in the former rather 
than the latter context, and therefore a "principle" of consultation is more 
applicable in the SOE context than under the RMA. 
Another important distinction between the two Acts is the manner in 
which the Treaty obligations are incorporated. Section 9 of the SOE Act 
states that nothing in that Act shall permit the Crown to act in a manner 
inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty ofWaitangi. In contrast 
section 8 of the RMA requires that the principles of the Treaty be taken 
into account by persons exercising functions and powers under the Act. 
The former Act therefore accords a priority to the principles of the Treaty 
which is not apparent in the RMA. 124 Thus the two statutory contexts are 
distinct in this respect, and this affirms the need for caution in transposing 
121 Above n 9, 60. 
122 Above n 9, 60. 
123 Above n 9, 61. 
124 See the Legislation Advisory Committee, Report No 6, Legislative Change: Guidelines on Process 
and Content (Revised edition, 1991) Appendix D, cited in M Chen and G Palmer Public Law in New 
Zealand (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1993) 417. 
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case authority from one into the other. The implications of the words "shall 
take into account" will be considered subsequently in this paper. 
It is therefore submitted that it is not legitimate to rely on the New 
Zealand Maori Council cases as authority for an unqualified Treaty 
principle of consultation. This is especially so given that those cases were 
decided in a distinct statutory context, and that the 1989 case extended a 
consultation obligation only in respect of truly major issues. 
3 Other sources of Treaty principles 
The foregoing analysis was focused on the legitimacy of relying on the 
1989 New Zealand Maori Council case as authority for an unqualified 
principle of consultation under the RMA. As stated this paper is concerned 
with the validity of decisions such as Gill and Quarantine Waste, which 
rely on the 1989 decision as authority for a consultative duty on the local 
authority. There is another aspect of this issue which is worthy of mention. 
The courts are not the only source of statements on Treaty principles. 
Boast and Edmunds note that there are three possible sources of material 
on the principles of the Treaty. These are decisions of the ordinary courts, 
reports of the Waitangi Tribunal, and government pronouncements on the 
Crown's obligations under the Treaty. 125 Therefore while it is sufficient for 
the purposes of this paper to consider the principles as defined by the 
Court of Appeal in the 1987 and 1989 cases, it is important to 
acknowledge the other potential sources of Treaty principles. 
125 Above n 91, TW-43. 
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The Court of Appeal in the 1987 decision noted that in determining the 
meaning of the expression "the principles of the Treaty ofWaitangi", the 
court "should give much weight to the opinions of the Waitangi Tribunal", 
although its reports are " not of course binding on Courts in proceedings 
concerned with other Acts" .126 It is submitted that a potential conflict 
arises in the situation where the Waitangi Tribunal's view of a Treaty 
principle is inconsistent with that of the Court of Appeal. This has arguably 
occurred in the context of consultation. Crengle has noted : 127 
In seeking to implement the [1987] decision, the Waitangi Tribunal 
identified the following areas where consultation will be 'highly 
desirable if not essential if legitimate Treaty interests of Maori are to 
be protected' ... 
The matters identified included . .. resource and other forms of 
planning, insofar as they may impinge on Maori interests ... 
The Waitangi Tribunal has therefore identified a Treaty based principle 
of consultation in the resource management context. It could be argued 
that this does not accord with the Court of Appeal's pronouncements in the 
New Zealand Maori Council cases.128 In this type of conflict the Planning 
Tribunal would be bound by the Court of Appeal decision, but not by the 
opinions of the Waitangi Tribunal. The difficulty in this regard is that the 
exact scope of the Court of Appeal defined consultation principle is not 
clear. 
126 Above n 113,661. 
127 D Crengle Taking Into Account the Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi (Ministry for the 
Environment, Wellington, 1993) 15 citing the Waitangi Tribunal Ngai Tahu Report - Wai 27 
(Brooker & Friend, Wellington, 1991). 
128 See discussion at above n 118. 
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It is interesting that Judge Kenderdine did not draw support from the 
Waitangi Tribunal Reports for the Treaty based principle of consultation 
relied upon in Gill. That Waitangi Tribunal has identified such a principle 
in the context of resource management, and the Court of Appeal has 
indicated that weight must be given to the opinions of that tribunal. It is 
submitted that this would have been a more justifiable approach than 
relying on the statements in the 1989 case. In any case the issue of whether 
consultation is a Treaty principle may not be settled, and the Gill approach 
could at some point become retrospectively legitimate. The writer believes 
however, that is not presently the case. 
C Taking into Account the Principles of the Treaty 
Section 8 of the RMA states that all persons exercising functions and 
powers under the Act are obliged to take into account the principles of the 
Treaty. It is necessary to examine the manner in which the Treaty 
principles are incorporated into the RMA. The decisions such as Gill and 
Quarantine Waste rely on the premise that section 8 imports a positive 
duty of consultation. The issue of whether consultation can be actually 
regarded as a Treaty principle in an unqualified sense has already been 
discussed. Even on the assumption that there was a Treaty principle of 
consultation, the effect of the expression "shall take into account" in 
section 8 must be considered. It is submitted that the Gill reasoning 
effectively ignores the legislative choice in terms of the incorporation of 
Treaty principles into the RMA. 
In the Haddon decision, Judge Kenderdine in discussing the meaning of 
the words "take into account", referred to the decision of Somers J in 
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R v CD129 . His Honour in that case considered the phrase "shall have 
regard to" and distinguished it from "shall take into account" by stating: "If 
the appropriate matters had to be taken into account, they must necessarily 
in my view affect the discretion [of the decision- maker.]11130 
Judge Kenderdine in Haddon noted:131 
[T]he duty to 'take into account' indicates that a decision-maker 
must weigh the matter with others being considered and, in 
making a decision, effect a balance between the matter at issue and 
be able to show he or she has done so. 
This approach would equally apply to any other person exercising a 
function or power under the Act. 
McHugh has commented: "The way in which the Treaty is expressly 
incorporated into a statutory scheme is as important as the simple fact of 
express incorporation."132 That writer noted that in some cases such as the 
SOE Act, the Treaty principles are given an overriding status, whereas 
other enactments list the principles as one of a number of factors to be 
considered. 133 
129 [1976] 1 NZLR 436 (CA). See also New Zealand Cooperative Dairy Company Limitedv 
Commerce Commission [1992] l NZLR 601. 
130 Above n 129, 437. 
131 Above n 9, 61. 
132 p McHugh The Maori Magna Carta: New Zealand Law and the Treaty ofWaitangi (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1991) 268 (emphasis added). 
133 Above n 92, 268. The RMA clearly falls into the latter class. 
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Fisher has noted in relation to the incorporation of Treaty principles 
into the RMA: 134 
It is however the form of the obligation in s8 RMA 91 that sets it 
apart from the previous legislation. The obligation is to 'take into 
account' the principles of the Treaty. The obligation is thus no 
more than procedural and deliberative. 
This approach was criticised by Judge Kenderdine in the Wellington 
Rugby case: l3S 
With respect to [Professor Fisher] , the obligation of the Treaty 
principles cannot be dismissed so lightly. Firstly, it is mandatoiy. It 
is only if the council officers cariy out research or consultation and 
are seen to do so by virtue of the material that they put before the 
council, that it can avoid being in breach of [section 8]. 
The essential question in this respect is what does it mean to "take into 
account" a principle of consultation? Does it mean that consultation must 
actually be conducted? In this regard it is submitted with respect that the 
Gill reasoning is subject to a logical inconsistency. It is arguably the wider 
principles of partnership and informed decision-making conducted in good 
faith which should be taken into account under section 8. Consultation may 
be one means of ensuring that these wider principles are considered in any 
exercise of power, however, it is not consultation in itself which should be 
taken into account. 
134 DE Fisher "The Resource Management Legislation of 1991: A Juridical Analysis of its 
Objectives" in Brooker's Resource Management (Brooker's, Wellington, 1991) 16. 
135 Above n 16, 22. 
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The Waitangi Tribunal has criticised the lack of priority which is given 
to the principles of the Treaty in Part II of the RMA. In the Ngawha 
Geothermal Resource Report 136 the Tribunal stated: 137 
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Crown in promoting 
[the RMAJ has been at pains to ensure that decision-makers are not 
required to act in conformity with, and apply, relevant Treaty 
principles. They may do so, but they are not obliged to do so. In 
this respect the legislation is fatally flawed. 
The tribunal recommended that a provision be included in the RMA 
requiring all persons exercising powers and functions under it to act in a 
manner consistent with the principles of the Treaty.138 
The Waitangi Tribunal therefore recognised that the duty on a local 
authority is less than would be expected of the Crown itself It is submitted 
that even if there is a duty of consultation on the Crown, the comments of 
the Waitangi Tribunal demonstrate why this duty should not be transposed 
to the local authority under the RMA. Section 8 confers an obligation to 
take into account the actual obligations of the Crown. Recognition must be 
given to the fact that Parliament has chosen a weaker form of Treaty 
incorporation in section 8.139 It is difficult to accept that the phrase used in 
136 Wai-304 (Brooker and Friend, Wellington, 1993). 
137 Above n 136, 145. 
138 Above n 136, 145. See also the comments by AL Mikaere "Maori Issues" [1993) NZ Recent Law 
Review (Legal Research Foundation, Auckland, 1993) 308, 318-319. 
139 Parliament could have chosen a stronger form such as "Persons exercising functions and powers 
under this Act shall not act in a manner inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi." 
The Review Group on the Resource Management Bill considered this form of incorporation, but 
considered it inappropriate on the basis that not all persons exercising powers under the RMA are 
parties to the Treaty; Report of the Review Group on the Resource Management Bill (11 February 
1991) 16. 
58 
that section was intended to confer on the local authority, obligations 
commensurate with those of the Crown. 
In the Hanton decision, Judge Sheppard approached section 8 by 
stating: 140 
Although s8 requires consent authorities to take into account the 
principles of the Treaty, we do not find in its language any 
imposition on consent authorities of the obligations of the Crown 
under the Treaty or its principles. 
The issue of whether the Crown can delegate its responsibilities under 
the Treaty, or in fact refuse to do so is a difficult one. In response to the 
decision of the Planning Tribunal in Hanton Palmer observed: 141 
[T]he Hanton decision is of legal interest in drawing attention to a 
possible distinction between the Crown and local authority 
obligations under the Treaty. The Planning Tribunal view [in 
Hanton] contrasts with the Waitangi Tribunal report, Manukau 
Harbour ... which states 'The Crown cannot divest itself of its 
Treaty obligations, or confer an inconsistent jurisdiction on others.' 
The question of whether the Crown is in breach of its Treaty 
responsibilities by conferring an inconsistent jurisdiction on the local 
authority under the RMA, is beyond the scope of this paper. It is arguable 
however that the Crown's Treaty obligations may not been transferred to 
140 Above n 26, 301. See the criticism of Hanton by FM Brookfield "Constitutional Law" [1994] NZ 
Recent Law Review (Legal Research Foundation, Auckland, 1994) 376, 379. That writer argues that 
the distinction between the Crown and the consent authority in that case is invalid in terms of the 
Treaty obligations. 
141 Above n 102, 23 . 
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the local authority under section 8. It is submitted that this diminished form 
of responsibility under section 8 has not been recognised in the reasoning 
of decisions such as Gill and Quarantine Waste . 
Crengle has argued: 142 
In terms of section 8, the use of 'take into account' indicates that in 
every case the principles of the Treaty must be considered and weighed 
against other factors in making a decision. Decision-makers need to be 
able to demonstrate how they have achieved the balance between the 
matters in coming to their decision. . . . Without evidence of ... 
consultation, local authorities may find it difficult to demonstrate their 
compliance with the duty set out in section 8. 
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how the section 8 duty may 
be discharged without the need for the courts to identify a duty of 
consultation. The final section of the paper is an attempt to outline how 
this may be achieved. The argument is that the local authority will be able 
to demonstrate that a balance with the Treaty principles has been achieved, 
without a need for active consultation by the council officer. 
This paper thus far has questioned the reasoning in decisions such as 
Gill and Quarantine Waste in two ways. First, the proposition that the 
1989 New Zealand Maori Council case identifies a Treaty based duty of 
consultation was considered. Arguments were forwarded that such a 
unqualified duty is unjustified on the basis of that decision. Secondly, the 
wording of section 8 of the RMA was analysed to decipher exactly what is 
required of the local authority under the Act. It was argued that even if a 
142 Above n 127, 21. 
60 
duty of consultation was imposed on the Crown as a result of the Maori 
Council case, that duty could not simply be transposed to the local 
authority on the basis of section 8. 
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VI THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE 
A number of cases on consultation in the Planning Tribunal have 
focused on the importance of natural justice in the resource consent 
procedure. This approach was summarised by Judge Treadwell in Rural 
Management: 143 
Perhaps to put the issue in a constitutional perspective, the Crown as a 
signatory to the Treaty applied the laws of this country to all peoples 
within it but guaranteed to Maori certain rights and privileges. What 
the Treaty did not do was to set aside a fundamental principle of our 
judicial system which is that no one party may be consulted or even 
spoken to without the other parties to proceedings being present. 
In the Ngatiwai line of cases the tribunal refused to accept that the 
consent authority as decision-maker was required to consult unilaterally 
with one party prior to proceedings. It has been noted that although Gill 
and Haddon do not specify the duty to be that of the council officer, this 
was arguably Judge Kenderdine's intention. The judge did make such a 
distinction in the Wellington Rugby case, which was decided shortly after 
Gill and Haddon, but was not cited in any subsequent tribunal decisions. In 
Whakarewarewa Judge Kenderdine clarified the Gill principle and noted 
that the council officers were responsible for consultation under section 8. 
The tribunal is therefore unanimous on this aspect of the consultation 
debate. While the actual extent of the duty on the council officer is not 
entirely clear, the tribunal appears to have settled the issue of natural 
143 Above n 42, 424. 
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justice in concluding that the consent authority shall not consult. It could 
be argued however that the "solution" advanced in Whakarewarewa does 
not fully resolve the natural justice issue. The concern in the tribunal was 
that the decision-maker must remain impartial, and that a duty of 
consultation threatened to disturb this balance. The duty was thus placed 
on the council officer, and this approach purported to satisfy section 8 of 
the Act while ensuring that natural justice was preserved. 
It is submitted that even consultation by a council officer may impinge 
on the principles of natural justice. The reason for this assertion is to be 
found in council practice. In the resource consent procedure the council 
officer processes an application and complies with the statutory duties such 
as deciding whether to notify the application, and informing the various 
parties of the hearing. That officer normally prepares a report for the 
hearings committee which is distributed among the parties prior to the 
hearing. This report covers a range of issues including any conditions 
which may be necessary, and a recommendation as to the appropriate 
decision.144 
The separation of roles between the council officer and the consent 
authority may therefore be questionable. It could be argued that the 
council officer is in fact an extension of the consent authority, and that any 
consultation conducted by that officer may be imputed to the authority. 
The recommendation in the officer's report arguably demonstrates that it is 
difficult to completely sever the roles of officer and decision-maker. The 
desired result of an impartial decision may be threatened by the decision-
maker's representative consulting with one party prior to the proceedings. 
144 The writer has obseived from appearances in this forum that this recommendation, and the report 
generally, can be highly influential to the hearings committee. 
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Judge Treadwell recognised this potential conflict in Rural 
Management: 145 
Those officers cannot ... consult on behalf of the consent authority, 
they can merely consult as officers for the purpose of obtaining 
information which can be relayed back to the consent authority for its 
consideration along with other evidence. 
It is submitted that the results of consultation contained in the pre-
hearing reports may constitute impartiality or bias in the form of "prior 
involvement" by the decision-maker. Flick has observed: 146 
... disqualification of a decision-maker may ... be sought on the basis of 
his prior involvement with the facts of the case he is later called upon 
to decide. This prior involvement may be caused by the frequent 
combination in the administrative process of the adjudicative function 
with, inter alia, the tasks of ... investigation. 
It could further be argued that this procedure breaches the audi alterum 
partem rule147 in that the reports are distributed to the parties sometimes as 
late as a few days prior to the hearing. This may leave insufficient time for 
the applicant to effectively respond to the results of consultation by the 
council officer, which may have occurred over a number of months. Hay 
has commented in this respect: "Disclosure of relevant information must 
also be made in adequate time to prepare a defence or comments." 148 
145 Above n 42, 424. 
146 G Flick Natural Justice (2 ed, Butterworths, Sydney, 1984) 164. 
147 The right to a fair hearing. 
148 JC Hay Section 27 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 - The Right to Justice: Something 
Old, Something New LLM Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 1991, 19. See also GDS 
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The right to natural justice is incorporated in the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 ("BORA"): 
27. Right to Justice - (1) Every person has the right to the observance 
of the principles of natural justice by any tribunal or other public 
authority which has the power to make a determination in respect of 
that person's rights, obligations, or interests protected or recognised by 
law. 
This paper does not afford the scope for a detailed analysis of whether 
the principles of natural justice are infringed in this consultation 
scenario. 149 If consultation and the subsequent reporting by a council 
officer could be shown to be a breach of the principles of natural justice, 
then section 27 of the BORA may be applicable. 150 It could then be argued 
that if an alternative interpretation to section 8 of the RMA is available 
which removes the infringement of the BORA, that interpretation should 
be preferred. 
Taylor "Administrative Law" (1993) NZ Recent Law Review (Legal Research Foundation, Auckland, 
1993) 369, 383. 
149 There is scope for an analysis of whether a report to the bearings committee of this type is in 
breach of standards such as bias, pre-determination, and impartiality under the wider heading of 
natural justice. This council officer's report has generally become accepted in practice, however it is 
arguably in need of scrutiny to ensure constitutional standards are not being compromised. 
150 As to the individual elements of s27 see JC Hay, above n 148, 8-15; and Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment Environmental Information and the Adequacy of Treaty 
Settlement Procedures (Wellington, 1994) 18-20. 
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Section 6 of the BORA states: 
6. Interpretation consistent with Bill of Rights to be preferred-
Whenever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent 
with the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that 
meaning shall be preferred to any other meaning. 
It is submitted that an alternative interpretation to the RMA is available, 
which would be consistent with the principles of natural justice. This 
alternative is that section 8 does not require consultation by the council 
officer. Rather, it requires that the hearings committee has sufficient 
information to make a decision which is informed and in good faith, in 
accordance with the principles of the Treaty ofWaitangi. The following 
section of this paper suggests an alternative approach to the section 8 
responsibility, which removes this potential infringement of the principles 
of natural justice. 
66 
VII AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
It has been argued that the Gill approach to the issue of consultation is 
inappropriate for a number of reasons. These include the issue of whether 
consultation is an unqualified principle of the Treaty, and whether section 8 
limits the Treaty responsibilities of local authorities. It has also been argued 
that a duty of consultation on the council officer is potentially in conflict 
with the principles of natural justice. 
It is therefore appropriate that an alternative approach is suggested 
which arguably fulfils the section 8 requirements, while avoiding any 
potential natural justice problems. It is submitted that this alternative 
approach would not only provide certainty for local authorities seeking to 
comply with the RMA, but would assist the tribunal in finding a "tolerable 
middle-ground." This approach is of course unable to reconcile the 
fundamental conflict in principle which has divided the tribunal. 151 
A The Focus under Section 8 
Section 8 of the RMA requires that persons exercising functions and 
powers under the Act take into account the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. It is respectfully submitted that Judge Kenderdine has resorted 
too quickly to the concept of consultation as necessary to achieve the 
purpose of section 8. 
151 That being whether s8 imports an active duty of consultation on the council officer. The Gill cases 
have relied on this proposition, and the Ngatiwai cases have refused to accept it. 
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It is submitted that the focus under section 8 of the RMA should be on 
the broader principle of partnership and the need for decisions to be made 
in good faith and on an informed basis. In this way consultation may be 
necessary as a means to this end, rather than an end in itself 
A number of tribunal decisions have adopted this wider approach to 
section 8 of the Act. While decisions such as Ngatiwai focused on the need 
for impartial decision-making, there was a broader approach to section 8 
than was found in Gill and Haddon. The High Court in Quarantine Waste 
while endorsing the narrower view of the section as was expounded in 
Gill, delivered a decision commensurate with a wider approach to the 
principles of the Treaty. This wider focus allows the council to satisfy the 
section 8 requirements without necessarily undertaking consultation in the 
resource consent procedure. 
B Consultation by the Applicant 
It is submitted that the council officer should adopt a supervisory role in 
terms of consultation with the tangata whenua. Upon receiving an 
application for resource consent that officer should inform the applicant 
that the interests of Maori must be considered. The applicant will be 
instructed to consult with the appropriate tangata whenua before an 
application in final form can be accepted. 152 The difficulty in this respect is 
that consultation by the applicant is not mandatory under clause l(h) of the 
152 The identification of the tangata whenua will be the responsibility of the council officer. This will 
require, inter alia, thorough consultation at the plan/policy statement preparation stage, as is required 
by the RMA; see the discussion at above n 108. In the resource consent procedure the officer may 
have to conduct ongoing consultation to determine which iwi or hapu holds mana whenua over the 
area and hence has the status of tangata whenua. This is a dillerent form of consultation to that in 
relation to the effects of an individual application. 
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Fourth Schedule of the Act. 153 Judge Kenderdine in Aqua King, however, 
indicated that an applicant could be made to conduct meaningful 
consultation by virtue of section 92 of the Act. Section 92(2) states: 
(2) Where the consent authority is of the opinion that any significant 
adverse effect on the environment may result from an activity to which 
an application for a resource consent relates, the consent authority may-
(a) Require an explanation of -
(ii) The consultation undertaken by the applicant; 
The council could therefore request an explanation of the consultation 
undertaken which "would allow the council to assess whether the 
consultation was adequate on an objective basis.11154 Judge Kenderdine 
went on in Aqua King to note that if the consultation was not adequate, 
further information could be required from the applicant in terms of section 
92 of the Act. Section 92 states:155 
92. Further information may be required - (l) A consent authority 
may, at any reasonable time before the hearing of an application, ... , 
require the applicant to provide further information relating to the 
application. 
153 See above n llO; cl 1 of the Fourth Schedule lists matters which should be included in an 
assessment of the effects on the environment. The consultation identified is not therefore mandatory. 
See the discussion in Greensi/1, above n 57, 9. 
154 Above n 72, 319. In terms of s92(2) note the wide definition of "environment" in s2 of the RMA. 
In Aqua King Judge Kenderdine held that this definition would encompass iwi concerns about coastal 
waters, above n 72, 319. 
155 See also s92(4) which states that further information may be required under the section only if the 
information is necessary to enable the consent authority to better understand the nature of the activity 
in respect of which the application for resource consent is made, the effect it will have on the 
environment, or the ways in which any adverse effects may be mitigated. 
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Judge Kenderdine held that the further information requested under this 
section could include a request for further consultation. 156 
This analysis demonstrates that there is a statutory procedure for 
ensuring that consultation by the applicant is adequate. Where the council 
believes that an application may have a significant effect on the tangata 
whenua of an area, an explanation of the consultation undertaken may be 
required under section 92(2). If this explanation reveals that the standard 
of consultation was not sufficient, the applicant could be made to conduct 
further consultation under section 92( 4). Judge Kenderdine in Aqua King 
noted that inadequate consultation by an applicant may result in delays in 
the processing of the application. 157 The council officer is therefore able to 
take into account the principles of the Treaty by ensuring that the views of 
the tangata whenua are sought at an early stage in the process. These 
views when placed before the hearings committee, would ensure that 
decisions are made in an informed environment. 
C The Pre-Hearing Meeting 
The council officer would also need to ensure that the views of the 
tangata whenua were accurately relayed by the applicant. Blanchard J in 
Quarantine Waste noted the potential for distortion if the council relied 
upon applicant consultation.158 
This reliability could be achieved in two ways. First, the officer could 
liaise with the tangata whenua, to ensure that their views were being 
156 Above n 72,319. 
157 Above n 72, 320. See also the discussion in Greensi/1 at above n 57, 7-8. 
158 See above n 21. 
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accurately conveyed by the applicant. Secondly, the officer could convene 
a pre-hearing meeting under section 99 of the Act, allowing the applicant 
and the tangata whenua to discuss their views with each other and with the 
council officer. This would ensure that the views of the tangata whenua 
were not distorted. Section 99(3) states: 
(3) The outcome of the meeting may be reported to the consent 
authority, and that report -
(a) Shall be circulated to all parties before the hearing; and 
(b) Shall be part of the information which the consent authority shall 
have regard to in its consideration of the application. 
Thus the officer could circulate a report of the meeting to the consent 
authority and the parties to the proceedings. This would avoid the natural 
justice concerns inherent in the council officer reporting to the consent 
authority the results of consultation with one party, and informing the 
other parties of these results shortly before the hearing.159 
D The "Tolerable Middle Ground." 
It is submitted that this approach would find favour on both "sides" of 
the Planning Tribunal debate on this issue. Judge Kenderdine accepted in 
Whakarewarewa that the convening of a pre-hearing meeting was sufficient 
to actually discharge the council officers duty under section 8 of the Act. 
In cases such as Rural Management, Tawa, and Banks, extensive 
consultation by the applicant was held to discharge the requirements of 
Part II of the Act. The tests in Ngatiwai and Hanton, that in some 
159 See the discussion of these concerns at above n 148. 
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circumstances a council officer may be under a duty to investigate or 
consult, would also be satisfied by this approach. It should also be noted 
that in any case where Maori interests are relevant, the tangata whenua 
should also be notified of an application. This would allow submissions to 
be made both on the application and at the hearing if necessary. 
E Summary 
It could be argued that this alternative approach has effectively imposed 
a duty of consultation on the council officer in any case. That may be so, 
depending on the definition of "consultation" being considered. The central 
argument in this paper has been that a council officer is able to discharge 
the section 8 duty, without conducting consultation in the form identified 
in Gill and Quarantine Waste. The wider focus on the adequacy of 
information under section 8, may at times involve conduct by the council 
officer commensurate with a concept of consultation. It is submitted 
however, that there is a subtle but important distinction between this 
definition of the section 8 duty, and that which originated in Gill. 
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VII CONCLUSION 
The decision in Gill v Rotorua District Council has been described as 
"an excellent decision in that several sections of the planning and 
development community now have a better understanding of their 
obligations under the [RMA] as a result of Judge Kenderdine's 
pronouncements. "160 The cases which have emerged since Gill will have 
sent that community's understanding of this issue into a state of turmoil. 
The law on consultation with the tangata whenua under the RMA lacks 
both clarity and direction. A detailed analysis of these cases has outlined 
the evolution of this issue through the various decisions. Further, this 
analysis has allowed a consideration of the law as it presently stands. 
The Gill decision identified that the local authority has a duty to consult 
with the tangata whenua in the resource consent procedure. This principle 
was based on section 8 of the RMA and the 1989 New Zealand Maori 
Council case. This paper has endeavoured to establish three things. First, 
the 1989 case is not sound authority for a Treaty principle of consultation. 
Further, the expression "shall take into account" reduces the impact of the 
Treaty principles on persons exercising functions and powers under the 
Act. Secondly, the principles of natural justice may be infringed by a duty 
of consultation on the council officer. This suggests that alternatives 
should be considered. Finally, the RMA facilitates an alternative approach 
to that originally taken in Gill. This focuses on the wider Treaty principle 
of infonned decision making, and the role of the council officer as the 
guardian of this principle. 
160 M Phillipson "Judicial Decision Making under the Resource Management Act 1991 : A Critical 
Assessment" (1994) 24 VUWLR 163, 170. The writer did, however recognise that the tribunal may be 
about to diverge from Gill. See footnote 24 at p 170. 
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This paper was written at an immensely interesting time in terms of the 
consultation debate. This issue is in dire need of an authoritative statement 
from a superior forum, which has considered the entirety of relevant 
decisions and arguments on consultation. It is hoped that this paper helps 
to identify that material. 
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